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Foreword 
Drawing on available academic literature and policy evaluation studies, the report aims to 
identify the impact of public support through equity instruments on firm performance, 
measured by growth in employment, turnover and innovative activities. It also puts 
forward main lessons on policy design and implementation. It employs a mixed-method 
approach based on evaluation synthesis. 
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Executive summary 
Drawing on available academic literature and policy evaluation studies, the report aims to 
identify the impact of public support through equity instruments on firm performance, 
and puts forward main lessons on policy design and implementation. It employs a mixed-
method approach based on evaluation synthesis (Edler at al. 2008).  
Key findings  
1. Outcomes 
 High-growth potential firms, which receive public funding in the form of 
equity, experience stronger increases in employment and turnover compared 
to the control groups.  
 The employment growth rate oscillates from 50% to 145% and turnover from 125 
and 800% (post-treatment), both are significantly higher compared to the 
untreated groups. 
 The firm profitability declines in the beginning, with progressive growth after 3-4 
years. 
 Most of the available evidence exists for early stage investment where public 
support is concentrated.  
 The effects are highly concentrated, with the top 5-15% of supported firms 
absorbing the vast majority of generated returns.  
 The majority of the national and regional equity measures achieve medium to 
high private investment leverage levels (2 to 3), with minimal or zero 
crowding out effects. 
 Equity is a good instrument for firm growth but does not necessarily impact 
companies' innovation performance. 
 Venture capital acts as a facilitator for the commercialisation of already 
developed innovations mainly through provision of finance, but also through 
partner networks and opening up of different channels of commercialisation.  
 The outcomes are heavily dependent on the number and quality of 
companies available to invest in and therefore on the general innovativeness of 
the regional or national economy. 
2. Design and implementation.  
 Syndication of funds with a leading role of the private sector (as opposed to 
government funds only). 
 Provision of long-term investments encompassing longer time spans and/or 
longer perspectives with less pressure on exits to achieve better outcomes in 
terms of employment and turnover growth. 
 Intervening both at the early and growth stages while making the 
intervention more flexible at the margins (i.e. allowing for some investments 
just under/over the equity gap).  
 Delivering added value services (e.g. networking and coaching) to the 
companies and ensuring that the fund is assisted by skilled professionals. 
 Flexible geographical boundaries together with larger size funds to enable 
a diverse portfolio of investments and sufficient funding for follow up rounds of 
financing. 
 Extending the indicators of success, beyond leverage effect, exits and fund 
profitability towards a closer examination of the effects on employment and 
turnover as well as the assessment of larger socio-economic benefits.  
The measures reviewed in this report form only a subset of a larger portfolio of 
policy measures required to provide companies with a set of funding opportunities to 
adequately fund their innovative ideas (with an important role of private capital). A 
complementary set of soft measures include nurturing the entrepreneurship capacity of 
innovators, providing them with the necessary skills, and fostering contacts with 
academia and other networks.  
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1. Introduction 
There has been a growing interest in policies supporting high-growth innovative 
enterprises (HGIEs) which are seen as important contributors to job creation and 
enhanced productivity growth (Hölzl 2016, Praag and Versloot 2008, Aghion et al. 2007). 
The recent years have seen the introduction of EU funding schemes supporting 
innovative firms through direct grants, loans, guarantees, and equity funding. The Start-
up and Scale-up Initiative includes, among others, changes to venture capital 
regulations, the creation of a pan-European venture capital fund of funds, and technical 
assistance for the Member States in this area. The Horizon 2020 SME Instrument and the 
Fast Track to Innovation Pilot also aim at providing innovative firms a faster access to 
public funding.  
There is evidence that innovative firms not only grow twice as much as their non-
innovative counterparts in terms of employment and sales but also faster growing firms 
continue to innovate providing impulses to rejuvenate the economy (Nesta 2009). This 
may be, in part, due to their absorptive/learning capacity (Jovanovic 1982, among 
others) and intensive R&I activities (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2013).  
However, according to a recent study by the EIB (2016), a significant proportion of KETs 
(key emerging technologies) companies, including innovation leaders with a documented 
solid growth, find it hard to raise the capital needed to expand. Thus, while there is 
evidence that high-growth innovative firms can be catalysts for aggregate economic 
growth, their capacity to grow is highly dependent on the access to financial resources.  
The JRC report Improving access to finance: which schemes best support the emergence 
of high-growth innovative enterprises? (Gampfer et al, 2016), of which this study is a 
follow up, gives a broad description of the set of strategies for external financing 
employed by high growth innovative enterprises. In brief, the HGIE rarely utilise internal 
financing given their financial constraints (Mas-Tur and Ribeiro Soriano 2014, Wang 
2014), consequently seeking external financing in the form of debt and equity. Yet, the 
literature shows that young innovative companies are often denied access to bank loans 
due to a lack of collateral (Hall and Lerner 2009, Audretsch and Weigand 2005, 
Carpenter and Petersen 2002). The existence of information asymmetries, often because 
of their typically high technological profile, makes access to funding more difficult. Those 
companies therefore tend to seek more risky forms of finance, such as venture capital.  
Public interventions therefore aim at facilitating the access to finance of young innovative 
firms through a number of instruments ranging from grants, loans and loan guarantees 
to equity instruments. However, questions arise as to the distinction between general 
innovation policies, SME policies that also target non-innovative SMEs, and industrial 
policies with a specific sectoral focus. HGIE policies are often at the intersection of the 
above. What is more, in the case of the supply of equity funding, the intervention is 
complementary to the existing services being provided by private actors.  
In this report, we focus on equity instruments that are aimed specifically at young 
innovative companies with growth potential. We however understand that our study does 
not cover all the possibilities of external financing that are open to those companies. In 
fact only a very small percentage of companies look for equity as a source of financing. 
According to Puri and Zarutskie (2011) using US Census data only 0.11% of companies 
established between 1981 and 2005 were supported by venture capital, while other 
studies report similar proportions oscillating around 1% of companies. Yet, many studies 
claim that those companies account for a much higher share of employment. Puri and 
Zarutskie (2011) estimate them at 5.3%-7.3% of the share of total US employment. 
Importantly, equity is rarely the first choice of those companies, fitting better only those 
firms with higher R&D intensity and higher risk profiles (OECD 2015, Gampfer et al. 
2016). Only about 6% of small firms use equity finance (European Commission 2015). 
Some studies (Amit et al 1990, Norton 1991) claim that VC funding may be a last resort 
and not the preferred choice as that would involve partial loss of control. Other studies 
stress the value adding services (e.g. expertise, contacts) behind the choice of VC over 
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bank funding (Ueda 2004, Hellman and Puri 2002). The literature, however, is not very 
forthcoming on the entrepreneurs' choice between different sources of funding.  
The availability of funding for young innovative companies depends heavily on their stage 
of development. Public funding sources dominate at the conception/idea stage while 
private venture capital tends to target later stages of the companies’ development as 
focusing on later-stage companies can be more cost-effective given the higher availability 
of information (De Prato, Nepelski, Piroli 2015, Kraemer-Eis et al 2016) leading to a 
private funding gap at the early stages of technology development. The second gap 
appears at the later stage where firms are preparing for growth. Recent surveys confirm 
that this gap is the biggest financial obstacle for start-ups to scale up in Europe 
(European Commission 2016).  Recently, governments have responded to the market 
failure (funding gaps) by developing financial instruments aiming at the early stage and 
growth stage of companies through loan guarantees, public equity instruments, 
syndicated loans or capital market regulation provisions (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 After Gampfer et al, 2016 
 
 
Those policies aim to respond to the supply side of the issue by ensuring that the 
companies have access to capital through equity markets. However, in order to see the 
full funding escalator that HGIE companies utilise, i.e. access to finance at all stages of 
company development (Nesta 2009), there is a need to look at the wider spectrum of 
instruments that also support the emergence of those companies bringing them to the 
growth stage. These complementary instruments are analysed in the forthcoming JRC 
reports on tax incentives for young companies and the use of grants aimed at growth and 
internationalisation.  
With respect to government VC support (the main focus of this study), this report 
distinguishes between several types of policy measures - tax credits to VC firms, 
matching/co-investment/hybrid funds that increase capital commitments such as fund-
of-funds (indirect funding) and direct government ownership of VC funds (direct funding).  
This report examines the output additionality (i.e., share of the firms' output that can be 
attributed to the public support, measured by firms' growth in terms of employment, 
turnover or innovative activities) of public equity instruments for young innovative 
companies with growth potential in 8 EU Member States that have a relatively advanced 
public support system: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom.  
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This study is an elaboration and expansion of the JRC study on equity public policies 
published in 2016 (Gampfer et al. 2016). Using the most relevant and recent literature, 
the study investigates the impact of those policy measures on companies' performance 
and derives lessons learnt from the evaluations. 
The project is part of a larger project exploring HGIE and scale-up company access to 
funding carried out jointly by JRC's Unit for Finance, Innovation and Growth, and the 
Units for Territorial Development and Digital Economy. 
After a brief discussion of the conceptual background for this study, Section 2 introduces 
our methodological approach and discusses some of the limitations of our research. 
Section 3 elaborates on the results of academic literature and policy evaluations. Finally, 
section 4 formulates some key takeaways and section 5 discusses policy implications. 
 
1.1 Equity support instruments – definitions and classification 
Equity finance is a means to raise capital by issuing "shares" in one form or another, i.e. 
investors acquire an ownership interest in the company. Equity can be raised from a 
variety of sources, which generally differ according to the size of the individual 
investments: from informal business angels who contribute a few thousand euros, over 
more professional business angel networks, venture capital firms and funds, large private 
equity investors, to initial public offerings (IPOs) on stock markets.  
The types of public policy instruments available on the equity side include: 
 Direct provision of venture capital:  
o Public venture capital funds directly investing in companies (i.e. 
investment decisions are made by public officials), usually alongside a 
private co-investor. The private co-investors might be granted preferential 
tax treatment on their capital gains or they could be protected from losses 
through downside guarantees. 
 
 Indirect provision of venture capital:  
o Public funds invested in private VC funds (hybrid VC).  
The term "hybrid fund" has been used in the literature to describe equity 
investment schemes that are government backed. Public funding is only 
used to leverage private investment. The investment decisions are taken 
by the private actors but the government sector may influence private 
funds' actions through guidelines or conditions governing investment 
criteria or individual deals. Public officials sit in the management boards of 
the private funds. One of the most common vehicles of indirect support is 
the fund-of-funds instrument whereby public funds-of-funds invest in 
private VC funds. 
 
 Equity guarantees or government-backed loans to finance VC:  
o Governments loan money to private financial intermediaries (funds or 
banks) to finance their VC investments, or issue guarantee such 
investments by covering potential losses to a certain extent and up to a 
defined limit. 
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2. Methodological Framework 
2.1 Research Design 
The empirical research for this study comprises 34 academic articles and policy 
evaluation reports of public equity instruments implemented in 8 countries with an 
advanced public support system over the last twenty years. In this report we adopted 
Edler et al. (2008)'s approach of evaluation synthesis. It predominately relies on 
qualitative analysis of existing impact evaluations and interpreting the research findings 
taking into account differences in policy contexts and methods. The key aim of this useful 
framework of analysis is to address issues of validity and to enhance the robustness and 
the quality of the research. 
2.2 Research Methods  
Policy evaluations are most often the assessments of a single instrument in a specific 
context of implementation. Yet, by combining insights from several evaluations it is 
possible to go beyond the specificity of the case study and derive more general lessons 
learnt as previously done in R&I policy (Edler et al, 2008; Gök and Edler, 2012) as well 
as in other areas (e.g. education, development aid or health). The growing literature is 
exploring the dispersed yet valuable body of evidence available in policy evaluations in 
order to analyse the impact of public policies (Edler et al, 2012; Gok and Edler, 2012, 
NESTA Compendium of Evidence of Impact with particular reference to Ramlogan and 
Rigby, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 2 Methodological approach of the study 
 
 
Our identification of policy instruments was based on Scopus database searches, contacts 
with national experts in each country (members of the Research and Innovation 
Observatory network), our own desk research and the use of the SIPER database.  
The policy measures in all Member States were identified and classified according to the 
type of interventions, investment stage and beneficiaries. In order to gauge the 
effectiveness of each of policy measure, we collected the evaluation studies along the 
"output additionality" dimension, rather than the "input" or "behavioural additionality". 
The "output additionality" approach addresses the effects of policy measures on the 
output of firms, measured by innovation activities, employment growth and firm 
performance.  
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2.3 Research Limitations 
Given the ex-post definition of high-growth firms and difficulties with their sampling, in 
this report we refer to the group of "young innovative companies with growth potential" 
to depict a heterogeneous, dynamic and yet recognisable group of innovative SMEs. The 
majority of R&I schemes target innovative SMEs, young innovative companies or fast 
growing firms with different inclusion criteria ranging from simple caps on revenue, 
through employment and age criteria, R&D intensity, growth stage and international 
market expansion to specific sector/technology focus. In our analysis we present those 
different targets showing the wide heterogeneity of policy options applied in the EU 
Member States.  
The evaluations used in this study vary considerably in their design, nature and the input 
and output variables they use. The study is therefore limited in providing a robust 
comparison of their outputs. Firstly, the use of different output indicators and its 
subsequent reporting that differs in granularity makes it difficult to compare instruments; 
secondly, the instruments differ in the way they are being set up and implemented which 
further hinders comparability of results. Finally, most of the evaluations are not 
controlling for multiple simultaneous treatment effects and therefore the attribution of 
the effect is problematic. In the venture capital funding case where firms go through 
multiple rounds of funding coming from public and private funds, this is even more 
problematic. 
Still, given the scarcity of literature on the impact of government-backed venture capital 
policies, the existing evaluations provide an interesting and valuable material to study 
and to attempt to come up with some policy implications. 
 
3. Results 
In our study we have focused on measures that have been sufficiently studied to be able 
to draw robust conclusions on their impact. As the policy arena is quite dynamic, a few of 
the measures examined have been modified and no longer exist in the same form or with 
the same name. 
There is an administrative difficulty in targeting high growth innovative companies given 
that their growth can only be defined ex-post and current growth (given its non-linear 
curve) is not a good predictor of future growth. Yet the equity measures explicitly target 
companies motivated to grow and with growth potential and therefore by definition are 
targeting potential high growth companies usually from innovative sectors.  
Nevertheless, there is not a large body of evidence demonstrating in a systematic way 
that the targeted support is delivering results therefore our study is aimed at filling this 
gap by examining a large sample of equity support policies.  
Our evidence base comprises of 34 sources, including 16 academic articles and 18 
evaluation reports using mixed methods. 
 
Table 1 Evidence base of the study 
 Comparison 
between public 
and private 
Public 
instruments 
Academic articles 7 9 
Evaluation reports  18 
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Therefore the results section focuses on the effects of equity and is presented in several 
sub-sections focused on investigating the impact of those instruments on firm 
employment, sales and innovation (measured most often by patent applications or patent 
counts but also by patent citation). In each sub-section, we provide evidence from both 
academic and policy evaluation studies addressing the question: what are the effects of 
policy instruments aimed at supporting high-growth firms on a set of output variables: 
employment, innovation, and high-growth firm performance?  
The methodology applied uses a systematic review of empirical evidence on high-growth 
innovative firm output additionality. We then focus the comparison of the effects of 
government-backed versus private venture capital on companies' growth and innovative 
activities as it is often contested whether government-backed VC can deliver the same 
results as independent (private) VC. Finally, we look at the available evidence on regional 
VC funds and their effectiveness compared to less geographically restricted support. 
The below subsections present studies using both econometric methods exploring the 
effects on firm output (such studies are quite rare) and other studies investigating these 
effects using descriptive statistics and qualitative methods (interviews, case studies, 
etc.).  
The recent literature (Helleman et al. 2017 and overview of literature by Da Rin et al. 
2011) points to the dearth of studies exploring the role of government policies supporting 
venture and more broadly equity investments beyond comparing the independent 
venture capital (IVC) and government-backed venture capital (GVC) efficiency. Most of 
the literature explores the impact on exits, IPO and leverage effects whereas studies 
looking at output effects on companies such as growth and employment are still rare. 
There is therefore a need to explore the limited evidence available from the evaluation of 
existing measures. Whereas there seems to be a consensus that a syndication of 
independent and government investments has positive effects both on exits and sales 
growth and that government is an indispensable actor to set out a vibrant venture capital 
market (Lerner 2009), there are other lessons learnt from the policy evaluations that 
could help to design good instruments of government-backed VC instruments.  
 
3.1 Impact of public equity support on employment 
 
All of the evaluated public equity support policy instruments in our sample of countries 
have a positive impact on job creation. The only exception is the Austrian AWS SME 
Fund where a mixed effect on employment was observed (between a reduction by one 
quarter and an increase by one quarter of employees). 
The exact effect on job creation varies across specific instruments but in general, in the 
cases when studies compare the employment effect of equity measures to a control 
group, the increase of employment is much higher for the supported firms than for the 
reference group (Table 2). For example, the evaluation of the Flemish Business Angels 
Networks the BAN-backed companies created on average 0.52 full-time equivalent (FTE) 
per year compared to a loss of 0.18 FTE per year for the companies not backed by BAN.  
The difference in employment growth rates between the treatment and the control group 
in the studies we examined varies between 22% for the German High-Tech Gründerfonds 
and 400% for the Enterprise Capital Funds in the UK. 
Other evaluations simply report the total number of new jobs created and/or maintained 
or the rate of total employment growth which varies between 10% and 100% (Table 3).  
As far as the cost-benefit analysis is concerned, based on the information provided in 
some evaluation studies on total instrument budgets and total number of jobs created, 
we computed the costs of the instrument per job created or maintained. The range 
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reported is between 38,000 (FII in Finland) and 75,000 euros (DGF equity investments in 
Denmark). 
Some evaluations (BIS 2011) point out the uneven distribution of employment growth 
within the group of supported firms. This skewed distribution has impact on the way we 
interpret the data, given that analysing the average outputs may be misleading. For 
example, while the overall growth rate for UKHTF supported companies is 10%, two 
businesses funded by UKHTF cited an increase of over 100 employees. It is therefore of 
paramount importance to look into those most successful examples to understand better 
under which conditions the schemes bring the positive and very high results. 
Those strong results should also be cautioned by the fact that the investments were 
made in very early stage ventures so that the employment started from a very low base. 
Indeed, when comparing two Austrian schemes, the one targeted at start-ups (AWS 
Start-Up Fund) exhibits a much more pronounced job creation effect than the scheme 
targeted to more established SMEs (AWS SME Fund). 
One evaluation in the UK (Baldock and Mason 2015) points out an important spillover 
effect which is not always accounted for when estimating the total employment effects of 
equity support measures, namely the considerable generation of contract employment.  
Finally, tax incentives for VC (Venture Capital Trusts and Enterprise Investment Scheme 
in the UK) seem to have the least pronounced employment promotion effect.
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Table 2 Effect of public equity instruments on firm employment: evidence from studies using control groups  
Study Methodology Country Programme/instrument Investment size Investment 
stage 
Type of 
equity 
Employment 
growth rate 
Baldock 
(2016) 
Survey, interviews, 
performance indicators 
UK Enterprise Capital Funds Sub-£2m Early stage Hybrid VC 85% increase 
(control group: 
22%) 
Forfas 
(2012) 
Desk research (review 
of application files), 
interviews 
IE Innovative High Potential 
Start-Ups Fund 
Max €1m Early stage Hybrid VC Between 50 and 
145% increase per 
supported plant 
(control group: 
decrease of 10.9%) 
Technopolis 
(2016) 
Comparison of survey 
results from funded 
firms with a control 
group of applicant firms 
that did not accept 
funding 
DE High-Tech Gründerfonds €0.5 – 2m Early stage Hybrid VC Average annual 
growth rate 50% 
(control group: 
41%) 
ZEW 
(2016) 
Survey (comparison of 
matched control 
groups), interviews 
DE INVEST Max €1m per year 
per company 
Early stage Tax 
incentive for 
BAs 
Difference of +0.27 
with the control 
group 
Cowling et 
al. (2008) 
Quantitative panel 
analysis 
UK Venture Capital Trusts and 
Enterprise Investment 
Scheme 
£200k – £1m Early stage Tax 
incentive for 
VC 
Negligible effect on 
job creation 
(regression 
coefficient 3e-7) 
Collewaert 
et al. 
(2010) 
Regression analysis  BE Direct subsidy to Business 
Angels Networks in 
Flanders 
€150k per deal Early stage Direct 
subsidy for 
BANs 
(50%of 
operating 
costs) 
0.52 FTE per year 
compared to the 
control group of 
non-BA backed 
companies -0.18 
FTE. 
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Table 3 Effect of public equity instruments on firm employment: evidence from policy evaluations without a control group 
Study Methodology Country Instrument Investment 
size 
Investment 
stage 
Type of 
equity 
Employment growth 
rate 
Funding per job 
created and/or 
maintained 
DAMVAD 
(2013) 
Input-output tables, 
survey, interviews 
DK Danish Growth 
Fund direct 
and indirect 
investments 
€0.5 - 5m 
(early stage) 
€5 - 25m (late 
stage) 
€25- 65m 
(buyout stage) 
Early and 
growth stage 
Direct VC, 
hybrid VC 
/FoF 
7,236 new jobs (2000-
2012) 
€75 000 
Vækstfond
en (2015) 
Descriptive 
statistics, 
interviews 
DK DGF 
Syndicated 
Loans 
€1m Early stage Syndicated 
loans 
502 new jobs (2011-2014) €40 000 
Ramboll 
(2011) 
Survey, 
quantitative panel 
analysis 
DE ERP Start 
Fund 
€0.5 – 5 m Early stage Hybrid VC 8 new jobs created and 10 
existing jobs secured per 
company (2006-2010) 
€42 000 - €55 000 
Saarikoski 
et al. 
(2014) 
Interviews, 
performance 
indicators 
FI Finnish 
Industry 
Investment 
€0.5- 5m 
(early stage) 
€5- 15m 
(growth stage) 
Early and 
growth stage 
Direct VC 
and hybrid 
VC/FoF 
3,834 new jobs (2008-
2012) 
€38 000 
Technopoli
s (2013) 
Interviews, focus 
groups, 
performance 
indicators 
NL Technopartner 
Seed Facility 
€100k – 2.5m Early stage Subordinate
d loans to 
private VC 
2,144 FTE jobs created €50 000 
BIS 
(2011) 
Desk research 
(review of 
programme 
documentation), 
interviews 
UK UK High 
Technology 
Fund  
£7m on 
average 
Early and 
growth stage 
Fund of 
funds 
10% growth  
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Baldock 
and Mason 
(2015) 
Survey, interviews UK Enterprise 
Capital Funds 
Sub-£2m Early stage Hybrid VC More than 100% growth 
Considerable contract 
employment generation – 
203 jobs since funding, 
majority of the jobs in the 
UK 
 
Angel Co-
Investment 
Fund 
 Early stage Syndicated 
investments 
with 
Business 
Angels 
100% growth (in 2 years' 
time) 
Parallel growth in contract 
labour 
 
Nesta 
(2009) 
Desk research, 
interviews 
UK Overview of 
several 
university and 
regional funds 
(EGF, RVCF, 
SEF, UCF, WF) 
Mostly under 
£200k 
Early stage Direct and 
hybrid VC 
1,407 additional jobs (1.8 
extra jobs per firm) 
 
PWC and 
ZSI 
(2017) 
Desk research 
(review of 
application files), 
survey, interviews 
AT AWS Business 
Start-Up Fund 
€100k – 3m Early stage Hybrid VC 33% growth  
AWS SME 
Fund 
€300k – €5m Early and 
growth stage 
Fluctuating between 25% 
growth and 25% decline 
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3.2 Impact of public equity instruments on firm performance 
 
One of the primary goals of equity support instruments is to foster the economic 
performance of beneficiary companies in terms of turnover/revenue growth1. According 
to the examined evaluation reports, all but two support instruments led to high 
turnover growth - Germany's INVEST programme where supported companies were 
found to have a lower turnover than the reference group and UK's Regional Venture 
Capital Fund where a decrease in sales by an average of £0.5m was observed.  
A thorough comparison of the economic performance effect of the policy measures is 
difficult to make since various evaluation reports apply different indicators (total revenue 
growth, turnover per employee growth, implied share of revenue growth) and focus on 
time periods with different length (1 to 5 years). Nevertheless, in the few cases where 
turnover growth is expressed in percentages and is compared to a control group, one can 
notice a significant difference between supported and non-supported companies (Table 4) 
except in the case of the German High-tech Gründerfonds where the growth rates of the 
two groups are similar and very high (800%). This is due to the control group 
construction approach – the control group comprises companies which were approved for 
Gründerfonds funding but instead chose to seek funding elsewhere. 
As far as the magnitudes of turnover growth are concerned, they are in all cases quite 
high, indicating that indeed equity financing is geared towards companies with high 
growth potential.  
What stands out in the evaluation literature is the observed concentration of impact on 
economic performance. For example, for the Irish High Potential Start-Ups Fund 10-15% 
of all firms deliver the vast majority of returns. Similarly, the Finnish Industry 
Investment direct equity investments evaluation points out that the growth impact is 
highly polarised - growth is coming from the top-5 companies in the sample. This is in 
line with the literature providing evidence of the high risk of venture capital investments 
and the heavy tailed distribution of revenue (Ghosh and Nanda, 2010). Even if it is not 
uncommon for the public support schemes that the outcomes are skewed towards a 
handful of high performers, two implications should be made. First, that the results 
should be studied in more detail since the averages are not very meaningful, secondly 
the use of case studies of those highly affected and unaffected firms can give a good 
understanding of conditions for the success of a given measure.  
In addition, an Austrian evaluation (PWC and ZSI, 2017) distinguishes the results 
between start-ups and SMEs in the expansion phase showing that the turnover growth of 
younger beneficiary companies (supported by the Start-up Fund) is four times higher per 
annum than the turnover growth of expanding SMEs (supported by the SME Fund). The 
BIS (2011) evaluation of  UK High Technology Fund of Funds (UKHTF) and the Bridges 
Fund (the programmes targeted the existing equity gap in high tech and improving 
access to finance in deprived areas respectively) also reports positive impact on turnover 
but the findings should be read with caution given the high proportion of start-ups and 
early stage businesses. Still, it should be noted that the investments in businesses at 
more mature stages delivered higher turnover increases in absolute terms. The study 
attributes part of the lack of turnover growth for some of the companies funded by 
UKHTF to the early stage technology development (still very far from the market) and 
effects of the 2009 recession. What is more, the Bridges impact on turnover is 
characterised by high attribution (the proportion of the effect on the company that can 
be attributed to the instrument effect) given low availability of other investment 
possibilities. The UKHTF is characterised by lower attribution given the fact that the 
companies went through several funding rounds after and/or before the UKHTF funding.  
                                           
1 Alternatively, in times of economic difficulty, or in regions affected by economic downturn, it may be intended 
as a mean to promote firm survival through provision of finance.  
 16 
 
As far as sales growth is concerned, the UK evaluation of BIS equity funds brings 
differentiated results with the Regional Venture Capital Funds resulting in contraction of 
sales on average by £0.5m and the other instruments – UK High Technology Fund and 
the Venture Capital Trust bringing sales increases of £1.4m and £4.6m respectively.  
As mentioned already above, the problem of attribution in case of venture capital is 
acute. The evaluation of the VCT suggests that the large increases may be due to firms 
receiving other co-investments at the same time (Cowling et al. 2008) and cannot be 
attributed fully to the VCT. Moreover, a separate evaluation of the VCT finds that the 
independent effect of the VC tax incentive on sales turnover is relatively small (Cowling 
et al. 2008). 
In terms of profitability, the studies find that it is often negative in the beginning (right 
after the support) but then it progressively increases, usually after 3-4 years (Nesta 
2009, Cowling et al. 2008). A similar observation is made about the Austrian AWS SME 
Fund where there is a slight decline in EBITDA of the beneficiary companies. The reason 
for the initial decrease in profits lies within the firms' growth process itself – an 
expansion is accompanied by higher capital expenditure (CAPEX) i.e. high investment 
costs into (new) products or services which decrease the firms' profitability in the short 
run (PWC and ZSI, 2017). Finally, the results of the evaluation of the Flemish subsidy for 
Business Angels Networks show similar story but using the return on assets indicator. 
The companies backed by BANs showed negative ROA till the fourth year after backing, 
contrary to non-backed companies whose ROA was positive. 
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Table 4 Effect of public equity instruments on beneficiary firm's economic performance: evidence from studies using control group 
Study Methodology Country Programme/in
strument 
Investment size Investment 
stage 
Type of 
equity 
Turnover/revenue/sales growth/return 
on assets 
Baldock 
(2016) 
Survey, 
interviews, 
performance 
indicators 
UK Enterprise 
Capital Funds 
Sub-£2m Early stage Hybrid VC 170% increase of total turnover from the time 
of investment until 2014 (control group: 43% 
increase) 
Forfas 
(2012) 
Desk research 
(review of 
application 
files), interviews 
IE Innovative High 
Potential Start-
Ups Fund 
(HPSU) 
Max €1m Early stage Hybrid VC 125% of total turnover increase (2005-2010) 
114.8% turnover per employee increase in 
supported firms vs 8.4% in all Irish firms 
surveyed (2004-2010) 
Technopolis 
(2016) 
Survey, 
interviews 
DE High-Tech 
Gründerfonds 
€0.5 – 2m Early stage Hybrid VC The same growth rate of both portfolio 
companies and control group (800%) 
Collewaert 
et al. (2010) 
Regression 
analysis 
BE Direct subsidy 
to Business 
Angels Networks 
in Flanders 
€867 741k in 1999-
2004, 50% of 
operating costs, 
€148000 per deal 
Early stage: 
Business 
Angels 
Business 
Angels Direct 
subsidy for 
BAN 
ROA of backed companies is negative till 4th 
year while a control group positive, ROA of 
companies backed through other channels 
also negative 
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Table 5 Effect of public equity instruments on beneficiary firm's economic performance: evidence from other studies 
Study Methodology Country Programme/in
strument 
Investment size Investment 
stage 
Type of 
equity 
Turnover/revenue/sales growth 
Vækstfonden 
(2015) 
Descriptive 
statistics, 
interviews 
DK DGF Syndicated 
loans 
€1m Early stage Syndicated 
loans 
€23 million of total revenue increase (2011-2014) 
Saarikoski et 
al. (2014) 
Interviews, 
performance 
indicators 
FI Finnish Industry 
Investment 
€0.5-5m (early 
stage) 
€5-15m (growth 
stage) 
Early and 
growth stage 
Direct VC and 
hybrid VC/FoF 
€657 million implied share of revenues (2008-
2012) 
Technopolis 
(2013) 
Interviews, 
focus groups, 
performance 
indicators 
NL Technopartner 
Seed Facility 
€100k–2.5m Early stage Subordinated 
loans to 
private VC 
€188 million of total turnover increase (2003-
2011) 
PWC and 
ZSI (2017) 
Desk research 
(review of 
application 
files), survey, 
interviews 
AT AWS equity 
instruments 
€100k – 5m Early and 
growth stage 
Hybrid VC Varies between +4%-10% turnover growth per 
annum for the SME fund and +31%-44% per 
annum for the Start-up fund 
Cowling et 
al. (2008) 
Quantitative 
panel analysis 
UK VCT and EIS £200k– £1m Early stage Tax incentive 
for VC 
Small effect on turnover (regression coefficients 
between 4.8e-8 and 8.6e-8) 
Baldock and 
Mason 
(2015) 
Survey, 
interviews 
UK Angel Co-
Investment 
Fund 
 Early stage Syndicated 
investments 
with Business 
Angels 
Aggregate turnover increasing by 60% since 
receiving funding in the previous 2 years 
BIS (2011) 
 
Desk research 
(review of 
programme 
documentation, 
interviews) 
UK 
 
UKHTF £7m on average Early and 
growth stage 
Fund of funds Increase in sales by an average of £1.4m 
VCT £200k – £1m Early stage Tax incentive 
for VC 
Increase in sales by an average of £4.6m 
RVCF Max. £500k Early stage Syndicated 
investment  
Decrease in sales by an average of £0.5m 
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3.3 Impact of public equity support on firms' innovation activities 
The policy evaluations of equity support measures do not always consider the impact 
of the incentives on company innovativeness but in the cases that they do, they find 
that beneficiaries have a high share of R&I activities, including R&D spending, 
patents, product and process innovations. For example, between 50% and 93% of 
the beneficiaries of studied programmes introduced some form of product or process 
innovation (Table 6). In a Finnish accelerator scheme, only three supported firms had not 
introduced any new products or services (Autio et al. 2013). 
The qualitative review of UKHTF and the Bridges Fund (BIS 2011) also supports the 
observation of a positive impact of VC investment on innovation, with a higher proportion 
of UKTF-funded companies attributing the introduction of new and improved products or 
services to the received funding (based on NAO survey from 2009 it was 75%). The 
Bridges Fund, having an objective of investing in disadvantaged communities, has been 
financing 'consumer champion' businesses i.e. offering value for money products and 
therefore has less impact on technology driven innovation, which is in line with the 
purpose of the fund – easing access to finance of entrepreneurs from disadvantaged 
communities. 
The often observed technology focus of the support schemes means that the share of 
these innovative products or services in the total sales is high (e.g. 67% for the 
beneficiaries of the VC Technology Fund Berlin).  
Comparative evidence with a control group is however largely missing from the policy 
evaluation literature. One exception is a Dutch evaluation (Ecorys 2016) which, by 
employing an econometric estimation, finds that funded firms are more likely by 1.6% to 
be innovative than non-funded firms. This difference is not very high and the observation 
is lent support by the evaluation of the German VC Technology Fund Berlin which notes 
that the percentage of supported companies that introduced new or improved products or 
services is only marginally higher than the German average.  
However, the academic literature sheds more light on the impact of VC on firms' 
innovative activities, often using sophisticated econometric approaches (Table 7). Kortum 
and Lerner (2000), looking at a panel of 20 US manufacturing industries over thirty 
years, found that increases in venture capital activity in an industry are associated with 
significantly higher patenting rates. Their results suggest also that the VC impact on 
patenting has been higher than internal R&D funding. Popov and Roosenboom (2009) 
using the same methodology for European countries with an 18-country panel covering 
the period 1991-2004, estimate that private equity accounts for as much as 12% of 
industrial innovation. Da Rin et al. (2011) based on their literature review suggests that 
the highly selective process of VC has impact on the future innovative performance of 
companies and the funding helps them to commercialise their ideas. Yet, the impact is 
less prominent on the generation of further innovation than on the exploitation of ideas 
that lead to the investment decisions. Rigby and Ramlogan (2013) conclude that the link 
between venture capital and innovation cannot be established based on the evidence 
available and stress the need of exploring the effects on the commercialisation of 
innovation rather than on spurring innovation. 
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Table 6 Effect of public equity instruments on innovation: evidence from the evaluation studies 
Study Methodology Country Programme/instrument Type of equity Innovation performance 
Baldock (2016) Survey, interviews, 
performance indicators 
UK Enterprise Capital Funds Hybrid VC 93% of funded firms introduced product or 
process innovations 
Ecorys (2016) Survey, interviews, 
performance indicators, 
econometric analysis 
NL Regional Development 
Agencies Capital Funds 
Direct and indirect 
equity 
Funded firms are more likely by 1.6% to be 
innovative than non-funded firms 
ZEW (2016) Survey, interviews DE INVEST Tax incentive for BAs Beneficiaries have a higher share of R&D 
activities (difference: 0.21) and a higher 
propensity to develop new products or 
processes 
Meyer at al. 2013 Survey, interviews, 
performance indicators 
DE VC Technology Fund Berlin Hybrid VC/mezzanine 
funding 
Around 40% of funded companies introduced 
new or improved products or services (the 
German average is 39%) 
Autio et al. 2013 Survey, interviews FI Vigo Accelerators Accelerators Only 3 supported firms haven't introduced any 
new products or services 
Baldock and 
Mason (2015) 
 
Survey, interviews UK 
 
Enterprise Capital Funds Hybrid VC 75% of companies introducing new products, 
services, marketing and processes  
Angel Co-Investment Fund Syndicated 
investments with BAs 
50% introduced new or improved patents and 
copyrights 
 
Table 7 Academic literature: impact of venture capital on companies' innovative activities 
Study Methodology Country Main results 
Kortum and Lerner (2000) reduced form regression, 20 manufacturing 
industries in the US 
US Venture capital accounts for 8% of industrial innovation in 1983-1992  
Popov and Roosenboom 
(2009) 
A panel of 21 countries (1991-2004) reduced 
form regression EU Private equity accounts for between 8% and 12% of industrial 
innovation since the early 1990s 
Rigby and Ramlogan 
(2013) 
Literature review  Worldwide The link between venture capital and innovation cannot be established 
based on the evidence available.  
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3.4 Comparison of impact of government-backed and private 
venture capital on companies' growth and innovative activities 
 
In the previous sections we found that government-backed VC investments have a 
positive effect on firm growth. In this section we provide evidence from the academic 
literature on the comparison of the effects of government-backed and 
independent (private) venture capital investments as it is an often discussed topic 
in the literature on financing high growth innovative companies.  
Brander et al. (2010) discuss the difference in performance between government-
supported VC firms (GVCs henceforth) and other types of i. GVCs are associated with 
lower performance, but when government invests alongside other VCs as a minority 
investor the effect becomes positive. Brander et al.'s (2015) international comparison 
shows that exit outcomes are better for mixed funding than purely private funding and 
when public finance and private venture capital are both present, total investment is 
higher. Interestingly, they also find that pure GVC enterprises have a higher rate of 
successful exit in Europe than in the USA. They also find that the relative performance of 
pure GVC investments is better in countries with relatively less developed VC markets. 
Grilli and Martinu (2014), using the VICO database and a sample of young high tech 
companies from seven European countries (BE, FI, FR, DE, IT, ES, and UK) confirm the 
view that syndicated investments from GVC and independent venture capital (IVC) have 
a positive effect on firm sales growth while GVC funds deliver similar results to the non-
backed companies.  
Some studies suggest that the lower effectiveness of direct GVC may be due to lower 
investment skills and expertise of government venture capital fund managers (Bottazzi 
et al. 2008). The literature also identifies several other reasons for the better 
performance of IVC - lack of administrative regulations (public funds impose caps on size 
of investments, use of different clauses, need of co-investments, restricted geographical 
scope of intervention), possibility of negotiating the rules between partners, focus on 
financial gains instead of other objectives that may divert the focus of investors and 
finally value-added skills of seasoned investors and fund managers. 
Luukkonen, Deschryvere, Berton (2013), based on a survey of young high-tech VC 
backed companies from seven European Countries (BE, DE, FI, FR, IT, ES, UK), explored 
the hypothesis of differences in added-value behaviours of independent and government 
venture capital vehicles. They show that the IVC firms were more advanced in 
professionalization activities such as changing the management team and finding board 
members and exit strategies. They do not however differ statistically significantly in the 
overall evaluation of added value of advice from experienced venture capitalists.  
Cumming, Grilli, Murtinu (2017) show that private IVC-backed companies have better 
exit performances than purely government-backed companies. Yet, the performance of a 
mix of independent and governmental VC investors brings more positive results than 
public venture capital.  The positive impact for the syndicated public-private funds is 
slightly higher on the likelihood of exits than IVC 
Finally, Bertoni, Tykvova (2015), based on a sample of young biotech companies in 
Europe, show that GVCs as stand-alone investors have no impact on invention 
(measured by patent stock) and innovation (by citation-weighted patent stock), whereas 
if complemented by IVCs they can act as a good support instrument.  
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Table 8 Academic literature: Comparison of impact of private venture and public venture capital on companies' 
innovative activities and growth 
Study Methodology Country Main results 
Brander et al. 2010 Regression 
analysis 
International A modest amount of GVC finance 
improves the performance of 
entrepreneurial ventures relative 
to private venture capitalists 
(PVCs). High levels of support 
from GVCs are associated with 
weaker performance (IPOs, 
acquisitions) 
Brander et al. 2015 Regression 
analysis 
International  Mixed funding has the highest 
investment level and better exit 
prospects as compared to pure 
PVC funding or pure GVC funding 
Grilli and Martinu (2014) VICO dataset, 
regression analysis 
7 European 
countries  
Syndicated/hybrid investments 
from GVC and independent 
venture capital (IVC) have a 
positive effect on firm sales 
growth while GVC funds deliver 
similar results to the non-backed 
companies 
Bottazzi et al. 2008 A collected sample 
of venture capital 
deals, survey 
data, regression 
analysis  
17 European 
countries 
Investor activism is shown to be 
positively related to the success 
of portfolio companies, with IVC 
more active than government 
owned firms. 
Luukkonen, Deschryvere, Berton (2013) VICO dataset, 
regression analysis 
7 European 
countries 
Contributions of IVC funds prove 
to be significantly higher than 
those of GVC funds as regards 
the development of the business 
idea, professionalisation and exit 
orientation. 
Cumming, Grilli, Murtinu (2017) VICO dataset 7 European 
countries 
IVC-backed companies have 
better exit performance than 
government-backed companies; 
mixed-syndicates of private-
independent and governmental 
VC investors give rise to a higher 
(but not statistically different) 
likelihood of positive exits than 
that of IVC-only backing 
Bertoni, Tykvova (2015) Regression 
analysis (young 
biotech and 
pharmaceutical 
companies) 
7 European 
countries 
Companies financed by 
syndicates and by private VC 
investors have a greater increase 
in innovation output (patents) 
than comparable non VC-backed 
companies. Results are best for 
hybrid/syndicated investments 
led by a private investor 
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3.5 Impact of public VC funds with a regional focus 
 
In this section we examine the evidence of geographical boundaries on public 
venture capital impact.  
The impact of public VC funds with a regional focus has been explored in the literature as 
many Member States have responded to regional equity gaps. Based on a sample of 
more than 600 VC backed companies (first round backing from either public or private 
VC fund) between 1998-2007  Munari and Toschi (2015) measured the exit rates and 
the capacity for attracting additional VC funding differentiating between regions based 
on their innovation intensity. They found that the regional funds are least efficient in 
leading their investee companies to an IPO or acquisition (17% less likely than private 
VCs) while national programmes are 10% less likely than private ones. Portfolio 
companies backed for the first time by the public sector also obtain fewer financing 
rounds and fewer syndicated investors. What is more, the ability to attract private 
capital acts as a 'certification signal' only in more innovative regions. The last conclusion 
supports the literature on the general positive impact of public funding on VC 
investments (see Lerner 1999 on the positive impact of the US SBIR grants but higher 
effect in VC intensive regions).  
The literature underlines the necessity for a sufficiently high quality deal flow (stream of 
companies available for investment and being able to generate revenue) for successful 
VC operations and its concentration in internationally competitive knowledge hubs (e.g. 
De Prato, G., Nepelski, D., & Piroli, G. 2015).  
The literature review shows that VC investments cannot function properly in areas of 
little or no innovative activity and therefore are not a good instrument of regional 
development policy. The evidence therefore argues against the use of small sized 
regionally-bound public venture funds.  
 
Table 9 Academic literature: Impact of regional funds 
Study Methodology Country Main results 
Munari and Toschi (2015) Firm level data, 
regression 
analysis 
UK Public VC funds, especially those 
with a specific regional focus, 
might be less effective forms of 
intervention because of the 
distortions their tight geographic 
constraints introduce 
Lerner (1999) Firm level data, 
regression 
analysis 
US SBIR awards (grants) had a 
strong positive impact on firms' 
employment and sales growth 
but only in locations with 
important VC activity 
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4. Lessons learnt and key takeaways 
4.1 Design and implementation of the policy measures 
 
 SYNDICATION: government or syndicated investments – direct or indirect 
investment 
 
The academic and the policy literature tend to converge on the negative lessons 
learnt from government-only venture capital funds and on the positive role of 
syndicated investments with government as a minority shareholder or investing 
indirectly through funds-of-funds (see section 3.4). The evaluation of the Finnish 
Industry Investment (FII) scheme (Saarikoski et al., 2014), which offers both direct and 
indirect equity investments, points out that as a result of the FII indirect equity 
investments the target companies have grown faster than their peers. At the same time 
for the FII direct equity investments the portfolio of companies on average have not 
been financially profitable. What is more, the growth impact of the FII direct investments 
cannot be considered satisfactory and is highly polarised, i.e. the top five companies 
account for most of revenue growth. The Danish Growth Fund experience (DAMVAD 
2014) also points out the limited effectiveness of direct investments given the small deal 
flow (few companies being invested in) and the lower than expected company 
performance.  
Based on the literature, this may be due to lower diversification of the portfolio 
companies than can be achieved across multiple private funds which reduces the overall 
risk. Secondly, the non-specialised funds may have problems in acquiring deep 
knowledge of different sectors, whereas in specialised funds, portfolio managers have 
more experience in selecting promising companies in their specific field (Gampfer et al., 
2016). Thirdly, fully public funds are less effective in the provision of coaching and 
mentoring for investee companies (Cumming 2013). Finally, direct public investment in 
businesses might crowd out private investment (Cumming and McIntosh 2006) while the 
reviewed policy literature on indirect equity measures finds zero or minimal crowding out 
effects (Baldock 2016, DAMVAD 2013, Technopolis 2016).  
Indeed our overview of the policy instruments and some recent evaluations (e.g. 
Baldock, 2016) note the shift of government-backed VC from direct funding which might 
require private matching2 (e.g. Finnish Industry Investment) to private VC-led hybrid co-
funding (e.g. the ECFs in the UK) or fund-of-fund structures (which now exist in a 
number of EU Member States). A number of evaluations (Technopolis 2013, Ramboll 
2011) claim that the main advantage of the reviewed schemes is the delegation of 
investment decisions to private parties i.e. the government provides co-financing only if 
there is a private lead investor (e.g. a VC company) which applies strict selection criteria 
and provides management support to the target firms. 
 
 SCOPE: regional focus and geographical boundaries 
 
The evidence in the academic literature (see section 3.5) points to negative 
experiences with regionally-bound public venture funds and advises against strict 
geographical boundaries. What is more, the venture capital instruments are judged 
less effective in areas with low innovation activity given the low supply of 
companies worth investing in. Our analysis confirms that in the case of Austria for 
example the funds were suffering from a limited supply of companies to invest in and the 
recent decision of the German High-Tech Gründerfonds to invest also in companies 
                                           
2 Almost all public VC funds require a private co-investor for their deals, with 50% being the maximum public 
investment. 
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head-quartered in other countries may point to a change in the policy. According to the 
evaluation of the regional Risk Capital Fund in Baden-Württemberg, investment by both 
federal and state level funds gives beneficiary firms access to several and wider 
networks of potential advisers, partners and investors (Bötel et al. 2013).  
The regional venture capital experience is largely negative given their smaller size 
and the limited deal flow in the regions with lower innovation capacity (Cowling 2012). 
Nevertheless, some regional funds evaluations (Hood 2000, BIS 2011) show 
positive impact albeit the result should be taken with caution since the evaluations are 
based on methodologies without a counterfactual and in the case of Scotland the fund 
has gone through several changes through time going from strict development goals to 
supporting high tech ventures at an early stage.  
 
 GOALS: 
o other objectives than financial returns – regional development, access to 
finance for specific groups 
 
The regional scope of the fund is often in line with implementing broader socio-
economic goals. The case of Bridges Fund I investing in deprived areas provided 
evidence of its positive impact on employment and turnover (albeit based on a 
qualitative study without a control group). These investments helped to create the 
market where the private investors were not active due to lower profitability. The UK 
Aspire Fund invested in women-led businesses in order to increase the number of those 
businesses in the UK. Overall, the potential of equity finance for promoting economic 
development including targeting deprived areas or underserved communities is a topic 
underexplored in the reviewed policy evaluation literature and merits further 
investigation. 
The academic literature highlights the issue of divergent objectives (private sector 
looking for returns whereas public investors seeking to have more vibrant regional 
economy, facilitating women's access to finance, promoting investments in businesses 
with a longer term profitability perspective) which may have a negative impact on the 
funds' sustainability. The question is whether those funds should have to perform on 
equal footing with private funds or if the state accepts them being not sustainable or less 
profitable. 
 
o creating private markets 
As a primary goal, many of the schemes studied aim to support the creation of a vibrant 
private equity market through guarantees for private investors, tax incentives and/or the 
provision of direct capital that is matched with the private investors' money in order to 
increase funding volumes and deepen the market. This objective is usually measured 
through the leverage effect. Most of the public equity instruments in our sample of 
evaluations were found to have a medium to high leverage effect. This usually varies 
between 1 and 5, i.e. for each euro of public money spent, the private sector added 1 
(ECF, Vigo Accelerators) to 5 euros (UKHTF, Finnish Industry Investment). The most 
often reported leverage rate is between 2 and 3 (SVCP, Danish Growth Fund, AWS 
equity funds).  
Creating sustainable private markets also relates to the issue of follow-up funding to 
maintain the growth process and to enable portfolio companies to reach their optimal 
exit size. Several evaluation reports mention the issue of the limited availability of 
follow-on funding and new market gaps appearing in the later stage after the 
introduction of the policy measure (Technopolis 2013, Baldock and Mason 2015). Since 
the majority of the policy instruments examined here are actually targeting the seed and 
early stage market gap (below €2.5m), an important observation that is also supported 
by the academic literature (e.g. Aernoudt 2017) is that a second- and third-round 
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financing gap has emerged in Europe. The evaluations of the UK Enterprise Capital Funds 
and the German High-tech Grüderfonds recommend that the size of the fund 
investments be increased to €5m and in the case of the High-tech Grüderfonds to 
increase the age limit of the target beneficiaries from 1 to 3 years. 
 
o investing with longer-term perspective 
Another goal may be to provide so called patient capital aimed at investments with 
a profitability that requires more time which is difficult to obtain in the private 
market. However, most of the public and public-private funds are set up within the 
standard 10 years life span (Durufle et al., 2017).  
 
 SPECIALISATION: investing in specific sectors  
 
The academic literature points to the relative specialisation of venture capital in 
high-tech industries with most of the investments targeted at ICT, biotech and life 
sciences. This specialization is strongly confirmed within our sample of evaluations. This 
typical focus of venture capital investment poses a problem of underinvestment in other 
sectors with longer time scales for the development of profitable business or with more 
risky profiles. An important policy question is whether the policy makers should, as some 
literature suggests, fill the financing gaps (where the private VC does not have interest) 
or intervene where the venture capital markets already exist and therefore there is a 
good chance of building a strong market. 
According to the evaluation of the Dutch Technopartner Seed Facility, different sectors 
have different capital needs, which means that funding ceilings should be more 
flexible, and that the balance between being 'market-led' and the 'checked and targeted' 
use of public money is a central question of instrument design. 
 
 SIZE: size of the funds 
 
According to Baldock and Mason (2015), the current size of the Enterprise Capital Funds 
(between £30m and £90m) is insufficient to adequately meet the current and forecast 
strong demand for high levels of follow-up funding. The average size of hybrid VC funds 
in Denmark is €250m which is larger than in the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, 
measured by fund size relative to GDP (DAMVAD 2013). In Finland, the size variation in 
supported funds is high. Most of the funds are between €50-200m and only seven 
exceed €200m but represent 57% of total commitments (Saarikoski et al. 2014). To 
address the later-stage equity funding gap where financing volumes need to be bigger, 
the need for increasing the size of the funds is therefore an important consideration. 
According to Invest Europe, the average size of a European VC fund is €65m in 2015 
which is too small to absorb the investments that big global institutional investors 
(pension funds and insurers) can make. 
 
 STAGE: early stage and growth phase gap - creating new equity gaps? 
According to the examined evaluations, there are two equity funding gaps: one in the 
early seed stage and one in the scale-up / later growth phase. While government-backed 
venture capital appears to be an effective instrument for addressing the early stage 
funding gap faced by young high-growth enterprises (Baldock, 2016; Technopolis, 
2013), studies on the financing context in Finland, Austria and the UK identify a clear 
gap in funding at the scale-up stage – between the start-up phase well-supported by 
public programmes and the pre-IPO/merger phase where private VC funds are strongly 
engaged since expected returns for investments in this phase are higher (Gill and 
Parnell, 2014; Saarikoski et al., 2014). Existing financial support instruments often seem 
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to fail to reduce this later stage gap which remains an important shortcoming (Gampfer 
et al., 2016). 
 
 SKILLS 
Several evaluations (Technopolis 2013, Bötel et al. 2013, BIS 2014) in line with the 
academic literature on private funds (Bottazzi et al. 2008 and Luukkonen, Deschryvere, 
Berton 2013) insist on the added value of a coaching and advice layer that is delivered 
with the funding. The advice and coaching has significant (albeit measured only through 
subjective opinions of beneficiaries) impact on the outcomes of the funded projects. This 
result complements those reported in the academic literature on value added of VC 
funds beyond alleviating financial constraints. It corroborates with the literature evidence 
of added value of equity in terms of impact on professionalization of companies and 
importance of networks (as opposed to debt instruments). The literature also notes 
the importance of skills of venture capital managers. Similar findings were identified for 
the direct R&D support for firms (see Cunningham, P.N., Gök, A. and Larédo, P. (2015). 
One example of a good practice is the High Tech Gründerfonds where large companies 
are also involved as investors in the Fund. This has the advantage of their expertise and 
networks and also fosters corporate venturing. 
 TIMING 
Some evaluations, when explaining policy shortcomings, refer to the poor timing of the 
intervention (for example, the UK High Technology Fund was set up when the private 
equity market had sufficient liquidity to serve the funding needs of companies without 
public intervention (BIS 2011). Timing is therefore crucial to achieve additionality of the 
support instruments and to avoid wasting public money. 
 
 LEVEL OF RISK 
 
The Dutch Growth Facility evaluation discusses the issue of due diligence of private 
equity funds which receive public support. For the implementation of the Growth 
facility, a rather heavy assessment procedure (by a special committee) was set up to 
assess excessive risk. Some interviewees found the whole process of accreditation and 
granting too burdensome (a “chicken and egg” situation in relation to the requirements 
of professionalism for newly established VC firms) but according to the evaluation this 
was done for the purpose of prudent spending of public money so the evaluators support 
the scheme design. 
4.2 Evaluation design and quality 
 
 time needed for a proper evaluation of results  
Most of the evaluations take a short term perspective in order to evaluate the results of 
the schemes, although we have also reviewed evaluations that analyse longer time 
spans (5-10 years of data). The literature also agrees that early evaluations may 
produce negative findings (see the evidence in section 3.2 of declining profitability in 
the first 3-4 years after investment due to focus on expanding markets, implementation 
of new services/products, etc.). The investment impact on firms can only be properly 
examined after at least five years as in the short post-investment term firms are going 
through significant changes in their organisation and processes that may actually have 
negative impact on their turnover or profitability (Nesta 2009).  
 evaluating the alignment with the broader instrument goals versus the financial 
performance only 
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The private venture capital funds are mostly evaluated on their financial 
performance and the ability of the companies to exit or perform IPOs. 
Nevertheless, the public programmes often aim at a larger set of goals including 
stimulation of regional or national entrepreneurship, fostering job creation or diminishing 
financial constraints of companies. The indicators used to evaluate the programme 
should therefore be aligned with the initial goals set by the policy makers in order to be 
able to assess the success of the instrument. The academic literature tends to be largely 
in favour of focusing on financial returns to escape the issue of moral hazard (i.e. to 
align the objectives of private investors and public fund managers). Yet, the financial 
performance of the fund should not be the sole indicator of the intervention success and 
ex-post evaluation should also bring the answer on how the instrument is answering to 
the high level policy goals (impact on employment, competitiveness of the economy, 
etc.).  
 looking at direct results for beneficiary firms more often than broader socio-
economic impact 
The other indicator used to assess the effectiveness of the public measure is the impact 
on the beneficiaries which provides more information about the optimal funding choices 
of the fund. If the rationale of investing in young innovative companies is based on their 
importance for the economy and their larger impact, the intervention should also seek to 
measure the positive spillovers and broader social benefits of those schemes. Only 
one policy evaluation report, that of the Danish Growth Fund, estimates the broader 
impact of the equity measures on Danish GDP. Findings from the NESTA compendium 
(Nesta 2013) tend to support the view that most evaluations look at the “success” 
(delivery, management, etc.) of the scheme rather than its actual impact on the broader 
innovation and socio-economic environment. 
 degree of attribution 
Another issue that has to be taken into account when designing a good evaluation of the 
public equity schemes is the fact that companies go through several rounds of funding 
that may have been obtained from different sources (public and private). The degree of 
the attribution of the effect of the funding under study may be therefore difficult to 
quantify and would require more sophisticated methodologies and better data 
collection. Most of the evaluations are not controlling for multiple simultaneous 
treatment effects and/or subsequent funding rounds and therefore the attribution of the 
effect is problematic. The reported effects may be due to accumulated funding and the 
share of a specific investment may be small. Yet, the public schemes can also be 
effective in signalling the company's value to private investors and can include soft 
measures (networking, advice) to assist the company in getting follow up funding. This 
attribution is however much more difficult to quantify and assess. Very few of the policy 
evaluations (e.g. Forfas 2012) tried to explore the evaluated measure with a more 
holistic approach, i.e. considering the level of complementarity between the examined 
programme and the other related programmes in the policy mix. 
 skewed distribution of outputs – concentration of impact in a handful of 
beneficiaries 
The skewed distribution of impact of public schemes and the acknowledged in the 
literature high tail distribution of venture capital investments has a lot of impact 
on the choice of methodologies for evaluations. Analysing the average outputs of firms 
may lead to superficial or even erroneous conclusions. The use of case studies and other 
forms of qualitative methods would therefore be beneficial to better understand the 
superior performance of the few beneficiaries and may help to distil the right conditions 
under which the instrument (or other forms of public intervention) can deliver those 
results to other beneficiaries.   
 considering alternative scenarios 
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As discussed in the introduction, the innovative companies with growth potential can 
choose between different options of accessing finance and equity capital is only one and 
often not the first of their choices. Given the relative high cost of the equity measures, 
the evaluations are rarely set up to compare treatment effects of different policy 
choices. Very rarely an evaluation is designed as to include in assessing the impact of 
the scheme the context of the specific broader policy mix (with its framework conditions, 
availability of soft measures such as training/mentoring support etc.) which would 
provide much more fine-grained policy implications. 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
Our findings based on the analysis of academic studies validate the hypothesis that 
high-growth potential firms which have received funding in the form of equity, 
experience an increase in employment and turnover, and expand their innovation 
activities more than those that have not received the support. The following table 
summarizes our key findings. 
 
Table 10 Impact of public equity instruments on firm's growth 
 
Equity instruments 
Employment 
 Equity instruments have a significant impact on employment. 
In the cases when studies compare the employment effect of 
the measures with a control group, the increase in 
employment is much higher for the supported firms than for 
the reference group. The range in terms of the size of impacts 
is however quite wide (by between 50% and 145%).  
 Some studies provide estimations on the cost effectiveness of 
those instruments with respect to employment creation with 
ranges from €38,000 (Finland) to €75,000 per job (Denmark). 
Turnover 
 The evidence on firms’ turnover is also positive with around 
125-800% of growth compared to pre-investment period 
whereas the control group in most cases exhibits only half of 
that growth rate. Yet, the evidence is limited to early stage 
investment where the usual low turnover base should advice 
caution in interpreting the results. 
 Importantly, the effects on economic performance are highly 
concentrated, with the top 5-15% of supported firms 
delivering the vast majority of returns. 
 In terms of profitability, the studies find that it is often 
negative in the beginning (right after the public support) but 
then it progressively increases (usually after 3-4 years). 
Innovativeness 
 Equity instruments are less often evaluated on their impact on 
firms’ innovation activities since the innovativeness of the 
company is often one of the selection criteria for venture 
capital. Indeed, the beneficiaries have a high share of R&I 
activities, including R&D spending, patents, product and 
process innovations but that share is not much higher than 
the comparable non-funded firms. This confirms the evidence 
from the academic literature pointing to the higher impact of 
venture capital on commercialisation of ideas rather than on 
innovation itself, with the contribution of venture capital to 
innovation being an indirect one, i.e. provision of networks of 
partners and opening to different channels of 
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commercialisation. 
Leverage,  
crowding-out 
effect, sectoral 
focus 
 A medium to high leverage effect is observed (2-3 on 
average), i.e. public policies manage to attract private sector 
investments. 
 As for the crowding out effect of public investment, the 
literature finds minimal or zero crowding out effects.  
 Some evaluations underline the concentration of equity on 
specific sectors, such as ICT and biotechnology.  
 
Public equity instruments are designed to target companies that are at the growth stage 
of their development and the evidence gathered in this report supports their having a 
positive impact on the beneficiaries' subsequent growth. Equity instruments offer the 
highest average amounts of funding ('deep pockets') directly aimed at growth (as 
compared to grants or loans) but also incur high costs given the high risk and 
operational costs of the schemes (e.g., demanding skilled fund managers, paying 
management fees, performing due diligence). Therefore there is a need to properly 
evaluate those measures taking into account their primary goals, be them private 
market creation, support for an innovative sector or regional growth.  
The evaluations examined in this report give many insights on the design and 
implementation of the public equity schemes. The most important policy implications 
evidence is: 
 
 in favour of the syndication of the funds with leading role of the private 
sector 
 against rigid geographical boundaries considering that the regional funds 
appear to be less effective 
 providing more patient investment with longer time spans and/or longer 
investment perspective with less pressure on exits 
 in favour of specialisation of the funds in specific sectors or flexible 
arrangements allowing for the adaption of the size of the intervention and 
other design features to the specific demands of the given sector 
 in favour of larger size funds to enable a diverse portfolio and sufficient 
follow up rounds 
 in favour of intervening both at the early and the growth stage while 
making the intervention more flexible at the margins in order not to lose on 
good investment opportunities (when defining where the fund may or may not 
invest) but avoiding crowding-out of the private investment (where 
sufficiently provided) 
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 in favour of providing added value services (such as networking and 
coaching) to the companies and making sure that the fund is assisted  by 
skilled professionals  
 in favour of the analysis of the timing of the intervention, i.e. analysis 
of the supply of the private capital at the time of the intervention to reduce 
the risk of crowding out 
 the optimum level of risk taken in case of syndicated / government 
intervention is difficult to identify with some literature suggesting targeting 
high risk ventures/ high risk sectors and some the middle ground.  
The academic literature is largely in favour of focusing on financial returns rather 
than other goals (e.g. regional development) but the evaluations' evidence remains 
inconclusive.  If funds are created with non-financial goals (and they usually are), this 
would call for a different way of evaluating their success, beyond leverage effect, exits 
and fund profitability towards a closer examination of employment and turnover 
growth as well as larger socio-economic benefits of the intervention. 
It is also important to note that the measures reviewed here form only a subset of a 
larger portfolio of policy measures required to provide companies with a funding 
escalator to enable them to fund their innovative ideas (with an important role of 
private capital) and also to develop a sufficient quantity of young innovative companies 
that are able and ready to grow. There is a need for a complementary set of soft 
measures nurturing the entrepreneurship capacity of innovators, providing them with 
the necessary skills, contacts with academia and other networks, etc. 
Another important implication stemming from the literature examined in this report is 
that governments are now the biggest single investors in early stage VC funds 
across Europe. Private institutional investors have moved away from investing in venture 
capital (especially at the early stage) (DAMVAD 2013) and public VC has increased its 
share of the VC market to about 40% in recent years (Aernoudt 2017). This observation 
is lent support by the evaluation of the High-tech Gründerfonds which notes the 
dominant position of HTGF as the most active early stage investor in Germany (40% 
market share) and the Finnish Industry Investment study, which indicates that FII has 
become a "gatekeeper" for new funds in Finland, i.e. it is regarded as a de-facto decision 
maker whether or not a new fund is launched in the country. 
Last but not least, there is an inherent problem with equity markets, either private or 
public, that stems from their tendency to concentrate in urban hubs, leading 
regions or countries. This results in making the innovative companies move from 
regions and countries with less growth potential to those offering better opportunities 
thus further impeding the capacity of lagging regions to catch up with innovation 
leaders. Yet, the evidence from the regional funds points to the shortage of readily 
available "deal flow" of companies that the venture capital can invest in. In the case of 
catching up regions, it is therefore important to create those investment opportunities by 
fostering general innovation capacity of small firms via grants and loans as the success 
of more targeted and riskier instruments (such as equity) for those motivated to grow 
depend highly on the general innovativeness of the regional and/or national economy.     
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